Texas Wesleyan Law Review
Volume 8

Issue 2

Article 3

3-1-2002

Paying for the Sins of Anotherparental Liability in Texas for the
Torts of Children
David F. Johnson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr

Recommended Citation
David F. Johnson, Paying for the Sins of Anotherparental Liability in Texas for the Torts of Children, 8 Tex.
Wesleyan L. Rev. 359 (2002).
Available at: https://doi.org/10.37419/TWLR.V8.I2.2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Texas Wesleyan Law Review by an authorized editor of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.

Johnson: Paying for the Sins of Anotherparental Liability in Texas for the

PAYING FOR THE SINS OF ANOTHERPARENTAL LIABILITY IN TEXAS FOR THE
TORTS OF CHILDREN
David F. Johnsont
I. INTRODUCTION ..........................................
II. STATUTORY BASIS FOR HOLDING PARENTS LIABLE FOR
MINOR CHILDREN'S TORTS .............................

III. COMMON LAW BASIS ...................................
A. Actions of Minor Children ..........................
B. Actions of Adult Children...........................
C. Negligent Entrustment...............................
IV. AVAILABILITY OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AGAINST
PARENTS ................................................
V. MINOR CHILD'S LIABILITY FOR HIS OR HER TORTIOUS
C ONDUCT ...............................................
A. Submission of Child Under ProportionateLiability
Questions in Charge ................................
B. Joinder of the Child .................................
V I. CONCLUSION ............................................
I.

359
359

361
362
369
373
374
374
375
376
378

INTRODUCTION

With all of the violence that is perpetrated by the youth of today's
society, victims are often left with no redress because youthful offenders rarely have any assets or any insurance coverage. Therefore, victims are seeking compensation for their injuries from the offender's
parents under a negligence cause of action, i.e., that the parents did
not properly supervise or control their child. This Article focuses on
the current law in Texas of holding parents responsible for the torts of
their minor and adult children. Additionally, this Article attempts to
give some insight into the various issues that may arise in prosecuting
or defending this type of lawsuit.
II.

STATUTORY BASIS FOR HOLDING PARENTS LIABLE FOR MINOR

CHILDREN'S TORTS

Texas Family Code section 41.001, entitled "Liability of Parents for
Conduct of Child," provides for some parental liability for minor chil-

dren's torts. This statute states:
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A parent or other person who has the duty of control and reasonable discipline of a child is liable for any property damage proximately caused by:
(1) the negligent conduct of the child if the conduct is reasonably
attributable to the negligent failure of the parent or other person to
exercise that duty; or
(2) the wilful and malicious conduct of a child who is at least 10
years of age but under 18 years of age.1
The first part of this statute provides that a person who has the duty to
control a minor may be liable for the property damage that is incurred
due to the negligent conduct of the minor that is attributable to the
person's negligent breach of his duty to control the minor.2 In other
words, if a person is supposed to control a minor, he can be liable to a
third party for property damage that is attributable to the minor's negligent conduct if the person's negligent lack of control allowed the
minor to be negligent.
The second part of this statute provides that persons who have the
duty to control a minor are liable for the wilful and malicious conduct
of the minor who is between the ages of ten and eighteen.3 This "part
imposes liability without fault and without necessity for a parent-child
relationship."4 It only requires "that the person to be held liable have
a duty of control and reasonable discipline over the child." 5 The purpose of this provision "is to protect and compensate property owners
from the wilful and malicious destruction of their property by
minors.'
This provision provides protection up to $25,000 in actual property
damages per occurrence plus court costs and reasonable attorney's
fees.7 One court has held that where a minor made an unauthorized
1.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 41.001 (Vernon Supp. 2002). This provision formerly

provided for liability of the "conduct of a child who [was] at least 12 years of age," but
in 2001, it was amended and the age limit was lowered to "at least 10 years of age."
Id. historical note [Act of May 21, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., S.B. 233, § 1]. This change
took "effect September 1, 2001, and applies only to property damage that occurs on
or after that date." Id. historical note [Act of May 21, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., S.B. 233,
§ 2]. A cause of action upon which property damage occurred before the effective
date is governed by the law in effect at that time. Id. historical note [Act of May 21,
2001, 77th Leg., R.S., S.B. 233, § 2].
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. Carl David Adams, Note, Has the Family Code Made Any Changes in the Liability of a Parentfor His Child's Conduct?, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 687, 691 (1974).
5. Id.
6. Buie v. Longspaugh, 598 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
7. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 41.002. This provision formerly provided for
only "$15,000 per occurrence, plus court costs and reasonable attorney's fees," but in
1997, it was amended and the amount raised to "$25,000 per occurrence, plus court
costs and reasonable attorney's fees." Id. historical note [Act of June 17, 1997, 75th
Leg., R.S., ch. 783, § 1, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 2571, 2571]. This change took "effect
September 1, 1997, and applies only to a cause of action that accrues on or after that
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withdrawal from his parents' account, the8 bank incurred only economic damages and not property damages.
This provision does not extend any liability upon parents for the
bodily injuries that their children may tortiously inflict upon third parties.9 However, parents may still be liable under common law causes
of action for the bodily injuries that are tortiously caused by their children. Section 41.001 does not abrogate any common law causes of
action.' 0 The older statute expressly provided that it was intended to
impose liability in addition to all other actions and that the purpose of
the statute was to impose liability on parents in situations where they
would not otherwise be liable. 1
Finally, some victims have attempted to use Texas Family Code section 151.001(a)(2) as a statutory basis to impose a duty upon parents
to control their children.1 2 This provision states, among other things,
that a parent of a child has "the duty of care, control, protection, and
reasonable discipline of the child."' 3 However, at least one court has
held that this provision is limited to the parent-child relationship and
that it does not create a duty on the part of parents to protect third
parties from their children's actions.1 4
III.

COMMON LAW BASIS

As stated before, parents may be liable under common law causes
of action for bodily injuries that are tortiously caused by their children. The general rule is that "there is no legal duty in Texas to control the actions of third persons absent a special relationship, such as
master/servant or parent/child."'" Further, "[a]t common law, the
mere fact of paternity did not make a parent liable for the torts of his
date." Id. historical note [Act of June 1.7, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 783, § 2,1997 Tex.

Gen. Laws 2571, 2571]. "A cause of action that accrued before the effective date...
is governed by the law in effect at the time the cause of action accrued." Id. historical
note [Act of June 17, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 783, § 2, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 2571,

25711.
8. Amarillo Nat'l Bank v. Terry, 658 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983,
no writ).
9. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 41.002.

10. See Adams, supra note 4, at 692-93.
11. See id. at 692-93; see also Act of May 31, 1957, 55th Leg. R.S., ch. 320, § 3,
1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 783, 783-84, repealed by Act of June 15, 1973, 63rd Leg., R.S.,
ch. 543, § 3, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1411, 1458.
12. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.001(a)(2).

13. Id.
14. See Rodriguez v. Spencer, 902 S.W.2d 37, 42 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1995, no writ).
15. Triplex Communications, Inc. v. Riley, 900 S.W.2d 716, 720 (Tex. 1995); Ely v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 927 S.W.2d 774, 782 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, writ denied);
see also Villacana v. Campbell, 929 S.W.2d 69, 75 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996,
writ denied) (holding no cause of action for negligent control of adult child).
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or her minor child[ren]."' 6 The existence of a special relationship,
such as parent-child, is not controlling."7 Indeed, in Texas, parents are
not strictly liable for their children's intentional actions.1 8 However,
under certain circumstances, where a parent has some culpability, he
can be held responsible for his child's intentional conduct that injures
another. 9 Additionally, parents can be vicariously liable for their
child's torts under a respondeat superior or joint enterprise theory,
where applicable.2"
A.

Actions of Minor Children

A parent whose minor child commits a tort can be found negligent
in the supervision and control of his or her child. 2' Negligence is a
common law cause of action under which a court can hold a defendant
liable for damages suffered by the plaintiff that were proximately
caused by the breach of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.22 The victim must present evidence to support each element of a
cause of action for negligence; those elements are: (1) a legal duty; (2)
breach of that duty; (3) proximate cause; and (4) compensable damages. 23 Therefore, in order to establish a cause of action for negligence, the victim must prove that the parents owed him a duty.2 4
Whether a duty exists is a threshold issue that should be answered
by a court when the facts are undisputed.2 5 In looking at whether a
duty exists, courts should look to several factors: (1) the foreseeability
of the general nature of the harm; (2) the degree of risk of injury to
the plaintiff; (3) the "likelihood of injury weighed against the social
utility of the actor's conduct;" (4) the magnitude of the burden that
would be imposed if a duty to guard against or avoid the activity is
16. Childers v. A.S., 909 S.W.2d 282, 287 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ);
Rodriguez, 902 S.W.2d at 42; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Richardelle, 528 S.W.2d 280, 285 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Moody v. Clark, 266 S.W.2d 907,
912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
17. See Rodriguez, 902 S.W.2d at 42.
18. See id. at 45.
19. Therefore, it is important to know whether the child is a minor or an adult. A
child is "a person under 18 years of age who is not and has not been married or who
has not had the disabilities of minority removed for general purposes." TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 101.003(a) (Vernon 1996); see also Villacana, 929 S.W.2d at 75. Further,
an adult is any other person. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.003(c).
20. See Rodriguez, 902 S.W.2d at 42; de Anda v. Blake, 562 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ); Aetna Ins. Co., 528 S.W.2d at 285.
21. See Isbell v. Ryan, 983 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998,
no pet.); Aetna Ins. Co., 528 S.W.2d at 285; Moody, 266 S.W.2d at 912.
22. El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 311 (Tex. 1987).
23. See Werner v. Colwell, 909 S.W.2d 866, 869 (Tex. 1995); Northwest Mall, Inc.
v. Lubri-Lon Int'l, Inc., 681 S.W.2d 797, 802 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Oldaker v. Lock Constr. Co., 528 S.W.2d 71, 77 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
24. See Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1983).
25. See Praesel v. Johnson, 967 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1998); Graff v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d
918, 919 (Tex. 1993).
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imposed; and (5) "the consequences of placing that burden on the [de27
fendant]." 26 Of these factors, foreseeability is the most important.
The Second Restatement of Torts sets forth a duty of care for parents of minor children and states:
A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control
his minor child as to prevent it from intentionally harming others or
from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily
harm to them if the parent
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control
his child, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for
exercising such control.2 8
This provision requires that the parent "knows or should know of the
necessity ... for exercising such control. ' 29 Therefore, before imposing a duty of control upon a parent, the Restatement of Torts requires
that the parent foresee a need to control, i.e., have some degree of
foreseeability. Despite the fact that no Texas court has ever adopted
this provision, Texas courts also impose the requirement of foreseeability before they impose a duty to control or supervise a child upon
a parent.3 °
In Moody v. Clark, a mother left her son and another young boy in
the back seat of a running car. The boys climbed into the front seat
and operated the running car causing the plaintiff to suffer property
damage and personal injuries. 32 The plaintiff sued the boy's mother
claiming that she negligently entrusted the car to the boy.3 3 The case
went to a jury, who awarded the plaintiff $10,000, and the defendant
appealed.3 4 The appellate court affirmed the judgment and stated
that although the mother did not "entrust" her vehicle to the boy, she
could still be liable where she makes accessible a dangerous instrumentality to the hands of a child. Commenting on this case, one
court has stated that "[d]eciding whether instrumentalities are inher26. See Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tex. 1994); Cent. Power & Light Co.
v. Romero, 948 S.W.2d 764, 766-67 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied);
Berry Prop. Mgmt., Inc. v. Bliskey, 850 S.W.2d 644, 654 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1993, writ dism'd by agr.); see generally El Chico Corp., 732 S.W.2d at 311-12.
27. Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965). For a good discussion of
this provision, see Jefferey L. Skaare, Note, The Development and Current Status of
ParentalLiability for the Torts of Minors, 76 N.D. L. REV. 89 (2000).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316.
30. Rodriguez v. Spencer, 902 S.W.2d 37, 43 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995,
no writ).
31. Moody v. Clark, 266 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1954, writ

ref'd n.r.e.).
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
See id. at 908-09.
Id. at 908.
Id. at 912-13.
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ently or potentially dangerous involves an element of anticipation,
what a parent knows or should know ....Although Moody does not
use the word 'foreseeability,' we conclude that parental anticipation of
danger was an element necessary to establish liability."3 6
In Rodriguez v. Spencer, the mother of a boy, who was beaten to
death due to a "gay bashing" incident, sued the parents of one of the
boys who participated in the beating.37 The plaintiff sued the defendant claiming that the parent-child relationship created a duty to supervise, control, and discipline the child.38 The defendant filed a
motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted.3 9
The plaintiff appealed, and the appellate court held that several factors are to be considered in determining the existence of a duty, including: "risk, foreseeability, and likelihood of injury weighed against
the social utility of the defendant's conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury and consequences of placing that
burden on the defendant."4 The court held that the most important
of these factors was foreseeability. 4 The court held that to establish
liability there must be parental anticipation of danger.4 2 "[T]he basis
of [a] parent's duty to third persons is [established through] the parent's knowledge, consent, sanction, or participation4 3in the child's activities," including the child's "violent tendencies.
Importantly, the court held that "[a]ctual knowledge is not required
if the parent should, under the circumstances, reasonably anticipate
the consequences of his or her actions."4 4 The court then went into a
lengthy discussion of the evidence to determine whether the child's
act was foreseeable to his mother.4 5 The evidence showed that the
mother established curfews and maintained discipline for the child.46
It further established that the defendant did not know her child to lie,
had never seen him with a weapon, had warned the child to stay away
from undesirable acquaintances, and had never known the child to
harbor negative feelings about homosexuals.4 7 The court determined
that it was not foreseeable to the defendant that her child would have
committed the crime because the child had never before demonstrated a propensity to act in such a heinous manner. 48 Thus, the
36. Rodriguez v. Spencer, 902 S.W.2d 37, 42 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995,
no writ).
37. Id. at 39-40.
38. See id. at 40.
39. See id.
40. Id. at 41.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 42.
43. Id.
44. Id. (emphasis omitted).
45. Id. at 43-44.
46. Id. at 44.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 45.
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court affirmed the trial court's granting of the defendant's summary
judgment.
In Childers v. A.S., the plaintiff was the mother of a child that
played sexual games with the defendant's child. 49 The plaintiff sued
the defendant based on a negligence cause of action and alleged: (1)
that the defendant failed to adequately supervise her child's activities
and conduct; (2) the defendant failed to report her child's actions to
local authorities; (3) the defendant failed to provide an environment
for the plaintiff's child free of mental and physical abuse; (4) the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in maintaining family relations of the plaintiff and her child when the defendant knew or should
have known about the acts of her child; and (5) the defendant failed to
exercise reasonable care in providing her child with reasonable psychotherapy and other necessary medical treatments.50 The defendant
moved for summary judgment based on the lack of duty, which the
trial court granted, and the plaintiff appealed.5 1
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court.5 2 The court first followed and expressly adopted Rodriguez in determining whether the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff's child. 53 The evidence showed
that the sexual acts took place in the plaintiff's home, the defendant
was not present or supervising the children when the acts took place,
and the plaintiff was often home when the acts took place.5 4 The
court also held that the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a duty as
an owner or occupier of property where the molestation took place.
In Pratherv. Brandt, the victim of a drive-by shooting sued a father
and son, alleging that they were both responsible for the shooting.5 6
The father purchased a shotgun for his son and loaned his automobile
to his son, and the son then participated in a drive-by shooting. 57 The
victim of that shooting sued the boy and his father on various claims,
including strict liability and negligence. 5 The trial court granted the
father a directed verdict after the plaintiff rested, and the plaintiff
appealed.5 9
First, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's directed verdict
as to the plaintiff's strict liability cause of action.60 The plaintiff argued that the parents should have been held liable under strict liability
49. Childers v. A.S., 909 S.W.2d 282, 285 (Tex. App.-Fort ,Worth 1995, no writ).
50. Id. at 286.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 285.
53. Id. at 289.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Prather v. Brandt, 981 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998,
pet. denied).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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"because the shotgun was an inherently dangerous instrumentality
and [the child's] actions on the night [the plaintiff] was shot were abnormally dangerous."'" The appellate court found that "Texas does
not recognize a cause of action of strict liability for 'ultrahazardous' or
'abnormally dangerous' activities."6 2
Second, the appellate court cited to Rodriguez and affirmed the
trial court's directed verdict as to the plaintiff's negligence cause of
action.63 The appellate court stated:
A parent may be liable if the parent negligently allows his child to
act in a manner likely to harm another, if he gives his child a dangerous instrumentality, or if he does not restrain a child known to
have dangerous tendencies. A parent's duty to protect third parties
from his child's acts depends on whether the injury to the third
party is foreseeable. Foreseeability is evaluated by looking at the
parent's64knowledge of, consent to, or participation in the child's
activity.
The court noted the son's "record of being ...responsible, respectful,
and well-behaved. ' 65 It noted that the father "did not know of any
disobedience or discipline problems," and that the son always followed the family's gun rules.6 6 Thus, the court held that the plaintiff
had not produced any "evidence raising a fact issue as to whether [the
'67
father] should have foreseen [the son's] actions.
In Isbell v. Ryan, a stepmother brought an action against her stepson's mother claiming that the stepson's mother negligently failed to
warn her that the stepson was a potential danger to her two young
daughters based on the stepson's alleged prior sexual molestation of
his cousin.6 8 The defendant had a report that her son likely molested
his young cousin. 69 However, the defendant did not warn either her
son's father or his new wife, the plaintiff, when the boy went to stay
with his father for the summer.7" The defendant filed a no-evidence
motion for summary judgment based on the
fact she has no duty to
71
the plaintiff, and the trial court granted it.
The appellate court reversed the summary judgment and held that
there was more than a scintilla of evidence that the defendant owed
61. Id.

62. Id. (citing Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, 166, 96 S.W.2d 221, 226
(1936)); see also Barras v. Monsanto Co., 831 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
63. Id. at 806-07.
64. Id. (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 807.

66. Id.
67. Id.

68. Isbell v. Ryan, 983 S.W.2d 335, 337-38 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998,
no pet.).

69. Id. at 337.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 338.
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the plaintiff a duty to warn of the boy's potential dangerousness.72
The court stated:
This court agrees that Rodriguez controls the case at bar with regard to the issue of foreseeability in the context of the parent-child
relationshipas it gives rise to a legal duty to protect third persons....

[T]he Rodriguez rule [states] that the basis of the parent's duty to
third persons is the parent's knowledge, consent, sanction, or participation in the child's tendencies to commit bad acts.
The evidence in this case shows that [the defendant] did not negate the issues of misrepresentation and foreseeability ....

Based

upon [the report of molestation] and her knowledge of the situation
by virtue of her position as [the boy's] mother and the [cousin's]
aunt, [the defendant] could have reasonably anticipated the danger
of allowing [her son] to go to the [plaintiff's] home without giving
the [plaintiff] adequate
warning of the possibility of danger to [the
73
boy's] half-sisters.
Thus, the court reversed the summary judgment and held that the
mother could be liable for her son's intentional acts because they were
foreseeable.
In Ordonez v. Gillespie, the defendants' mentally challenged son
sexually assaulted the plaintiff, who was a hotel housekeeper, while
she attempted to clean the defendants' room." The plaintiff sued the
defendants and alleged that they were negligent in the supervision and
control of their son." The defendants filed a no-evidence summary
judgment alleging that there was no evidence that the defendants'
son's conduct was foreseeable.7 6 The trial court granted the defendants' motion, and the plaintiff appealed.7 7
The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment. The court
stated:
Duty is the threshold inquiry. It is the function of several interrelated factors, the foremost and dominant consideration being foreseeability of the risk. A parent's duty to protect third parties from
the acts of the parent's minor child depends on whether the injury
to the third party is reasonably foreseeable. Foreseeability means
the actor, as a person of ordinary intelligence, should have anticipated the dangers his negligent act created for others. In the absence of foreseeability, there is no duty.78
The court reviewed the plaintiff's evidence and stated:
72. See id. at 341.
73. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
74. Ordonez v. Gillespie, No. 05-99-02095-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas Mar. 28, 2001,
no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 1965, at *1.
75. Id. at *1-2.
76. Id. at *2.
77. Id.
78. Id. at *4-5 (citations omitted).
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[e]vidence that [the defendants' son] did not like school and disrupted class is no evidence that his parents should have foreseen the
possibility that he was capable of assaultive conduct. Likewise, evidence that [the defendants] considered him to be mentally handicapped is79no evidence that it was foreseeable he might be a danger
to others.

In Milligan v. Soto, the plaintiff left three of her children in the
defendant's day care." ° The defendant's son, who was mentally retarded, sexually abused two of the plaintiff's children. 8 The plaintiff
sued the defendant based on negligence and breach of contract.8 2 The
defendant filed a summary judgment motion on these claims, which
the trial court granted. 3 The plaintiff appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment.84 The court stated that the
plaintiff's only evidence that it was foreseeable that the defendant's
son would sexually assault the plaintiff's children was that he was
mentally retarded.8 5 The court also stated that the plaintiff presented
no evidence that a mentally retarded person was any more likely to
sexually abuse a child than someone without mental retardation.8 6
The court found that because the defendant's son never had any disciplinary problems, never engaged in criminal or sexual conduct, and
never stated any sexual interest in children, his sexual assault on the
plaintiff's children was not foreseeable. 87 Accordingly, the court affirmed the summary judgment as to the plaintiff's negligence cause of
action.88 Regarding the plaintiff's breach of contract cause of action,
the court held that where a contract fails to expressly set forth the
duties and responsibilities of the parties, the reasonableness of a
party's actions is relevant to whether there was a breach of the contract.8 9 Consequently, the court found that because the defendant's
son's actions were not foreseeable, there was no breach of the
contract. 90
The basic theme running through all of these cases is that before a
parent owes a third party a duty to control his or her minor child, the
parent must reasonably be able to foresee the minor child's complained of conduct. If a court determines that, under the facts of the
case, the parent could not have foreseen the child's conduct, then the
79. Id. at *7-8.
80. Milligan v. Soto, No. 07-00-0543-CV (Tex. App.-Amarillo June 22, 2001, no
pet.) (not designated for publication), 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 4167, at *1.
81. Id.
82. See id. at *2.
83. Id. at *2-3.
84. Id. at *3, *12.
85. Id. at *8.
86. Id.
87. Id. at *8-9.
88. Id. at *9.
89. Id. at *10-12.
90. Id. at *12.
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parent owes no duty to third parties to control his child or to warn
third parties of his child. A determination as to foreseeability is obviously a case-specific determination. Texas has not set out a clear standard for what prior acts will give a parent notice that his child may
commit a tortious act. However, before a child's violent acts can be
foreseeable, there certainly should be some similar prior violent activity by that child. Other jurisdictions seem to have adopted the very
strict and narrow standard that where the child does not commit the
same act in the past, the complained of act is not foreseeable. 9' Thus
far, the only Texas case reversing a finding of no parental liability for
the tortious acts of a minor child involved the parent having actual
knowledge that the child committed the exact same act (sexual assault) in the past. 92 Though Texas's standard may not be clear, there
should still be some evidence of a prior similar tortious act by the
child before the child's parents owe a duty to third parties.
B.

Actions of Adult Children

Where an adult child lives with his parents and commits a tortious
act, the victim of that tortious act may attempt to hold the parents
liable for the act. Once again, plaintiffs often allege that the adult
child's parents had a duty to control and supervise the child or a duty
to warn the victim of the child's dangerous nature. However, generally, the law imposes no duty upon persons to act.93 As the Texas
Supreme Court has stated,
if a party negligently creates a dangerous situation it then becomes
his duty to do something about it ... [but] it may be said generally,
as a matter of law, that a mere bystander who did not create the
91. E.g., Snow v. Nelson, 475 So. 2d 225, 226 (Fla. 1985) (finding it was not foreseeable that the child would attempt to injure others with a croquet mallet because
there was no prior acts by the child of swinging the mallet); see, e.g., Dinsmore-Poff v.
Alvord, 972 P.2d 978, 979, 986 (Alaska 1999) (holding that prior act of shooting a
person in the hand was not sufficient to put parents on notice that child would commit
murder); Parsons v. Smithey, 504 P.2d 1272, 1273, 1275-76 (Ariz. 1973) (in banc)
(finding that prior threats that child would throw rocks at a strange woman did not
put parents on notice that child would beat the victim with a hammer); Gissen v.
Goodwill, 80 So. 2d 701, 702, 705 (Fla. 1955) (concluding that prior act of striking
hotel employees where child lived was not sufficient to put parents on notice that
child would sever employee's finger by slamming door on employee's hand); Wells v.
Hickman, 657 N.E.2d 172, 178 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that prior acts of beating
a dog to death and killing a hamster and knowledge that child needed psychological
help were not sufficient to put parents on notice that child would beat neighborhood
child to death); see generally Skaare, supra note 28.
92. See Isbell v. Ryan, 983 S.W.2d 335, 340-41 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1998, no pet.).
93. Nash v. Perry, 944 S.W.2d 728, 729 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. 1998); Venetoulias v. O'Brien,
909 S.W.2d 236, 242 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ dism'd by agr.).
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dangerous situation is not reuired to become the good Samaritan
and prevent injury to others. 9
The "[m]ere knowledge of a dangerous situation imposes only a moral
duty to warn or render aid, [it does not impose any] legal duty."9 5
Further, a parent is not liable to third persons solely because he or she
has been appointed guardian of his adult child under the Texas Probate Code.96
In Villacana v. Campbell, the defendants' adult son, who had been
living with them, shot and killed a man. 97 The victim's parents sued
the defendants alleging that they negligently failed to control their
adult child and negligently entrusted their adult child with a firearm. 98
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment,
and the plaintiffs appealed.9 9 The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment and stated:
Liability for negligence requires the existence of a legally cognizable duty ....

A court can, therefore, properly dispose of a negli-

gence case by summary judgment if it finds no duty in the actor
even assuming all facts alleged in the petition are true.
There is no general duty to control the conduct of third persons.
This rule applies even if the actor has the practical ability to control
the third person. The law creates exceptions to this rule when the
actor and the third person have a special relationship which imposes
a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct. Included within these special relationships is that of parent/child.
• . . No current Texas law imposes liability on a parent for the
actions of an adult child. We hold that, as a matter of law, appellants have no cause of action for negligent control,
and the trial
10 0
court's grant of summary judgment was proper.
The court then held that the parents were not liable under a theory of
negligence for failing to control their adult child.'
In Melchor v. Zapata, the defendants' adult son killed the plaintiffs'
son with a bat at a party thrown by the defendants' son at the defendants' house.' 0 2 The plaintiffs sued the defendants and alleged that
94. Abalos v. Oil Dev. Co. of Tex., 544 S.W.2d 627, 633 (Tex. 1976) (ellipsis in
original) (quoting Buchanan v. Rose, 138 Tex. 390, 391-92, 159 S.W.2d 109, 110
(1942)).
95. Barras v. Monsanto Co., 831 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
96. See TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 673 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
97. Villacana v. Campbell, 929 S.W.2d 69, 72 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996,
writ denied).
98. Id.
99. Id.

100. Id. at 75 (citations omitted).
101. See id.
102. Melchor v. Zapata, No. 01-95-01226-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug.
29, 1996, no writ) (not designated for publication), 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 3953, at

*1-2.
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they "were negligent and created a dangerous condition on the premises by allowing [their son] to have an unsupervised party."I 3 The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted,
and the plaintiffs appealed. 0 4
The appellate court held that under the plaintiffs' negligence cause
of action for failing to control their son, the defendants did not owe a
duty to third parties in their role as the parents of an adult son who
lived at home."0 5 However, the court went ahead and assumed that
even if a duty was owed, there was no evidence that the defendants'
son's actions could have been foreseen by the defendants.' 0 6 The
court analyzed the evidence and found that there was no evidence that
the defendants knew or should have known that their son had violent
tendencies. 0 7 Further, under the plaintiffs' landowner claim, the appellate court held that because the plaintiffs' son was not invited to
the party, he was a trespasser."°8 The court held that there was no
evidence that the defendants willfully or wantonly caused the plaintiffs' son's death as is required by a trespasser to prove that a landowner owes him a duty.'0 9 Additionally, the court held that the
defendants' actions in leaving their son alone did not proximately
cause the plaintiffs' son's death; the court stated, "[t]he connection
between the [defendants'] leaving [their son] at home unsupervised
and the events leading to [the plaintiffs' son's] death is too attenuated
to establish legal cause. ' 10 Therefore, the appellate court affirmed
the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants."'
In Kovar v. Krampitz, an eighteen-year-old threw a party where the
plaintiff's son had consumed alcohol." 2 The plaintiff's son was then
permitted to drive an automobile, which he wrecked, killing himself." 3 The plaintiff sued the eighteen-year-old and his parents under
theories of negligence per se and common law negligence." 4 The
court of appeals held that the parents of a child who is eighteen years
of age or older are not responsible for the acts of their adult child.' 15

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

*2.
*7.
*7-9.
*5.

110. Id. at *6.
111. Id. at *9.

112. Kovar v. Krampitz, 941 S.W.2d 249, 251-52 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1996, no writ).
113. Id. at 252.
114. Id.
115. ld. at 255.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

13

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 8 [2022], Iss. 2, Art. 3

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8

In Cain v. Cain, the defendant allowed his daughter and son-in-law
to move into his home. 1 6 The defendant also allowed his minor niece
to move into his home.'
While the defendant's niece was living in
the home, she was raped repeatedly by the defendant's son-in-law.' 8
The evidence showed that the defendant knew that his son-in-law had
been placed on probation for sexually assaulting a seventeen-year-old
girl at his job and knew that he had been jailed for violating his probation.t1 9 Further, many of the rapes occurred after the defendant's
son-in-law and niece had been drinking alcohol in the defendant's
presence, and drinking alcohol was a violation of the son-in-law's probation. 2 ' The niece sued the defendant and his daughter, and the
jury found for the niece. 21
The defendant appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the jury's
verdict. 22 The court relied upon an exception found in section 448 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts,123 which states:
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime
is a superseding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's negligent conduct created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the third person to commit such a tort or
crime, unless the actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized
or should have realized the likelihood that such a situation might be
created, and that a third person might24avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort or crime.1
The appellate court reasoned that when the defendant's niece moved
into his home, the defendant knew that his home was already inhabited by an adult male on probation for sexually assaulting a minor and
that his son-in-law had violated his probation.125 Therefore, the court
ruled that it reasonably should have appeared to the defendant that
his son-in-law would attack his niece
and that the defendant owed a
26
duty to prevent harm to the niece.'
Therefore, it appears that absent a parent's creating a situation
where an adult child will foreseeably injure a third person, a parent of
an adult child should not be liable for the adult child's tortious
conduct.
116. Cain v. Cain, 870 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ
denied).

117. Id.
118. Id.

119. Id. at 678-79.

120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 679.
Id. at 680.
Id. at 680-82.
See id. at 680.

124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965). The Texas Supreme Court
has previously adopted the exception found in section 448. Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt.
Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 550 (Tex. 1985).

125. Cain, 870 S.W.2d at 680.
126. Id. at 680-81.
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C. Negligent Entrustment

One potentially valid claim that a victim can raise against the parents of a tortfeasor is negligent entrustment. This would occur where
the parents of the tortfeasor loaned the tortfeasor some instrument by
which he injured the plaintiff. As one court has stated:
[a] person who gives a chattel to another, knowing the other person,
due to youth, inexperience, or other factors, is likely to use the chattel in a manner involving unreasonable risk of harm to himself or
others, may be held liable for harm caused by the use of the
chattel.' 27
The well established elements of negligent entrustment of a vehicle
are: "(1) the owner entrusted the automobile (2) to a person who was
an incompetent or reckless driver, (3) who the owner knew or should
have known was incompetent or reckless, (4) the driver was negligent,
and (5) and [sic] the driver's negligence proximately caused the accident and the plaintiff's injuries.' 1 28 These elements can be useful in
the determination of a negligent entrustment
claim concerning the en29
trustment of chattels other than vehicles.
In Kennedy v. Baird, the plaintiffs went to the defendant's house. 3 °
The defendant's son began shooting at them and injured them. 31 The
plaintiffs sued the defendant for negligently entrusting his son with a
gun.132 The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which
was granted, and the plaintiffs appealed. 3 3 After deciding that it was
possible to bring an action for negligent entrustment of a firearm, the
appellate court examined the affidavit of the defendant.1 34 That affidavit stated that the defendant's son was self-employed, had his own
car, and that the defendant seldom saw him.' 3 5 He stated that he had
no knowledge of his son ever using a gun on any person or car and did
not believe that his son had a violent temper.' 36 The plaintiffs responded by offering affidavits that proved that the son had pushed
another boy down on one occasion and had a reputation for having a
violent temper. 3 7 The court found that the defendant had no knowl127. Prather v. Brandt, 981 S.W.2d 801, 806 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998,
pet. denied) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390).
128. Id. (citing Soodeen v. Rychel, 802 S.W.2d 361, 362 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1990, writ denied)).
129. See id.
130. Kennedy v. Baird, 682 S.W.2d 377, 377 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, no writ).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. Id. at 378-79.
135. Id. at 379.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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edge of his son's propensity to commit the type of act complained of
138
or to use rifles dangerously and affirmed the summary judgment.
IV.

AVAILABILITY OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AGAINST PARENTS

A victim's cause of action for exemplary damages will be controlled
by the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code sections 41.001
through 41.013, as amended in 1995.139 Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 41.005 precludes a plaintiff's claim for exemplary
damages against parents of children who commit torts.1 40 That provision states: "In an action arising from harm resulting from an assault,
theft, or other criminal act, a court may not award exemplary damages
against a defendant because of the criminal act of another.' 141 However, this exemplary damage limitation does not apply when:
[The parents are] criminally responsible as a party to the criminal
act under the provisions of Chapter 7, [Texas] Penal Code;
... the criminal act occurred at a location where, at the time of
the criminal act, the [parents were] maintaining a common nuisance
under the provisions of Chapter 125, [Texas] Civil Practice and
Remedies Code, and had not made reasonable attempts to abate
the nuisance; or
...the criminal act resulted from the [parents'] intentional or
knowing violation of a statutory duty under Subchapter D, Chapter
92, [Texas] Property Code and the criminal act occurred after the
142
statutory deadline for compliance with that duty.
Other than these few narrow exceptions, parents of children who commit tortious acts should not have to face a claim for exemplary
damages.
V.

MINOR CHILD'S LIABILITY FOR His OR HER
TORTIOUS CONDUCT

"As a general rule, minors are civilly liable for their own torts,"' 4 3
provided that the child has the capacity to commit the particular tort
138. Id. at 379-80.
139. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 41.001-.013 (Vernon 1997 &
Supp. 2002).
(a) This chapter applies to any action in which a claimant seeks exemplary
damages relating to a cause of action.
(b) This chapter establishes the maximum exemplary damages that may be
awarded in an action subject to this chapter, including an action for which
exemplary damages are awarded under another law of this state.
Id. § 41.002 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
140. See id. § 41.005 (Vernon 1997).
141. Id.
142. Id. (citation omitted).
143. Prather v. Brandt, 981 S.W.2d 801, 806 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998,
pet. denied).
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involved.' 4 4 Further, minor children can commit wilful and intentional torts, thus opening themselves up to punitive damages.' 4 5 Because a minor child can be held responsible for his or her tortious
conduct, the parents of a child that commits a tort may want to join
their child in the suit as a party defendant to lessen the parents' proportionate liability findings.
A.

Submission of Child Under ProportionateLiability
Questions in Charge

The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code sections 33.001
through 33.017 (Chapter 33) describe the current practice of proportionate liability in Texas.14 6 Before tort reform, Chapter 33 did not
apply to a claim based on intentional torts. However, as of September
1, 1995, Chapter 33 does apply to intentional torts. Chapter 33
provides:
The trier of fact, as to each cause of action asserted, shall determine
the percentage of responsibility, stated in whole numbers, for the
following persons with respect to each person's causing or contributing to cause in any way the harm for which recovery of damages is
sought, whether by negligent act or omission, by any defective or
unreasonably dangerous product, by other conduct or activity that
violates an applicable legal standard, or by any combination of
these:
(1) each claimant;
(2) each defendant;
(3) each settling party; and
(4) each responsible third party who has been joined under Section 33.004.147
The term "responsible third party" is defined as
any person to whom all of the following apply:
(i) the court in which the action was filed could exercise jurisdiction over the person;
(ii) the person could have been, but was not, sued by the claimant; and
(iii) the person is or may be liable to the plaintiff for all or a part
claimed against the named defendant or
of the damages
148
defendants.

144. Williams v. Lavender, 797 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ
denied); see also Chandler v. Deaton, 37 Tex. 406, 407 (1872-73); Bailey v. C.S., 12
S.W.3d 159, 162-63 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, no pet.); Prather, 981 S.W.2d at 806;
Childers v. A.S., 909 S.W.2d 282, 287 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ).
145. See Williams, 797 S.W.2d at 412.
146. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.001-.017 (Vernon 1997 &
Supp. 2002).
147. Id. § 33.003.

148. Id. § 33.011(6)(A).
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Under this definition, a parent's child that commits an intentional tort
would be considered a "responsible third party." Therefore, if the
child who is the active tortfeasor is brought into the suit as a responsible third party, the jury will have the opportunity to determine the
percentage of responsibility for each person who contributed to cause
the claimant's harm by either a negligent act or any other conduct or
activity that violates an applicable legal standard. 149 The use of comparative responsibility to attribute the cause of the plaintiff's damages
to the criminal is potentially one of the main defenses of negligent
defendants, and this defense has been recognized in many jurisdictions. 150 Therefore, the only remaining step to having the offending
child submitted under the proportionate liability question in the
charge is that the child has to be joined under section 33.004 of the
5
statute.' 1
B. Joinder of the Child

Chapter 33 has its own joinder provision. Section 33.004 states,
"[e]xcept as provided in Subsections (d) and (e), prior to the expiration of limitations on the claimant's claim for damages against the defendant and on timely motion made for that purpose, a defendant may
seek to join a responsible third party who has not been sued by the
claimant."'' 52 Therefore, if the statute of limitations has not run on the
plaintiff's cause of action against the child, the parent is entitled to
join the child in the suit as a responsible third party if the motion is
made in a timely fashion.
Traditionally, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 38 (Rule 38) has governed joinder of third parties. 53 The Author is not altogether certain
that Rule 38 governs joinder of responsible third parties as Chapter 33
has its own joinder provision in section 33.004. However, Rule 38
does not necessarily conflict with Chapter 33, and cases interpreting
Rule 38 may be applicable in interpreting Chapter 33's joinder
provision.
Rule 38 states,
[a]t any time after commencement of the action a defending party,
as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a citation and petition to be

served upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be
liable to him154or to the plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim
against him.

149. See id. § 33.003.
150. See generally Martin v. United States, 984 F.2d 1033, 1038-40 (9th Cir. 1993).

151. Whiteside v. Watson, 12 S.W.3d 614, 623 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2000, pet.
dism'd by agr.) (interpreting that a person must be a party to be submitted under
proportionate liability question). See generally Martin, 984 F.2d at 1039.
152. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.004.
153. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 38.
154. Id.
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Therefore, under this rule, parents would be entitled to a joinder of
their child as the child "may be liable to ...the plaintiff for all or part
of the plaintiff's claim." '5
However, one limitation is that joinder must be done in a timely
fashion.' 56 Section 33.004 states, "on timely motion ... a defendant
may seek to join a responsible third party who has not been sued by
the claimant."15 Further, Rule 38 states that a defendant has to have
leave of court to join a third party defendant if he does so later than
thirty days after the service of his original answer.15 8 Therefore, if
parents wait until after thirty days from their original answer, they
must ask for leave of court and may face some argument that their
motion is not timely. However, there is no requirement that a third
party claim be159brought within thirty days of the date of the defendant's answer.
In determining whether leave should be granted and any additional
parties should be joined, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 37 prescribes,
"[b]efore a case is called for trial, additional parties . . . may be
brought in, either by the plaintiff or the defendant, upon such terms as
the court may prescribe; but not at a time nor in a manner to unreasonably delay the trial of the case."' 60 Therefore, the timeliness inquiry is whether the joinder of the child will unreasonably delay the
trial of the case.
One leading commentator in Texas procedural law states, "[1]eave
should be liberally granted."1 6 ' "[T]he rules of procedure encourage
joinder of all interested parties."' 6 2 The very basis of joinder and severance rests on the concept of "judicial efficiency as well as on the
policy of providing full and adequate relief to the parties."' 6 3 "A
court has great discretion as to whether or not to permit joinder ...
and its decision [should be] based on practical considerations with a
view to [what is] fair [and] orderly."' 6 4 The key is whether a delay is
reasonable or not under the facts and circumstances of the suit, keep155. Id.

156. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
157. Id. (emphasis added).

REM. CODE ANN. §

33.004.

158. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 38.

159. Conroe Truck & Tractor, Inc. v. Childs Truck Equip. Inc., 723 S.W.2d 207, 209
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
160. TEX. R. Civ. P. 37 (emphasis added).
161. 1 Roy W. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 5:75 (1992).
162. In re E.L.P., 636 S.W.2d 579, 581 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ); see
also Lloyds Cas. Insurer v. Farrer, 167 S.W.2d 221, 228 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1942),
affd, 141 Tex. 497, 174 S.W.2d 302 (1943).
163. OKC Corp. v. UPG Inc., 798 S.W.2d 291, 293 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no
writ); see also Valley Indus., Inc. v. Martin, 733 S.W.2d 720, 721 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1987, orig. proceeding); Threeway Constructors, Inc. v. Aten, 659 S.W.2d 700, 701-02
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ); Williamson v. Tucker, 615 S.W.2d 881, 886-87
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
164. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 327 S.W.2d 358, 373 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1959, no writ).
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ing in mind the history of the suit and not simply that a delay will
occur. 165 A trial court may consider, among other things, whether the
joinder would delay the trial of the case and what effect the joinder
would have on discovery in the case.' 6 6
Obviously, the sooner the child is joined, the less chance there is
that the plaintiff will object to the timeliness of the joinder. However,
the decision to join the child, the active tortfeasor, is not so simple.
The parents may well believe that having the benefit of a reduction in
their responsibility percentage will be offset by an increase in the
damage award because a jury is likely to award a higher amount of
damages with the active tortfeasor sitting in the courtroom and participating in the trial. Therefore, all of the ramifications of having the
child joined in the suit should be considered by the parents.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Victims of juvenile crime often feel that the child and the child's
parents are morally at fault for their injuries and damages. However,
moral responsibility and legal responsibility do not always coincide.
To some extent, the juvenile justice system can relieve some of the
victim's feelings of anger toward the child, but there is often no crime
committed by, and no criminal proceedings brought against, the parents. Therefore, the victim may attempt to seek justice and compensation from the parents through the civil justice system. This Article has
attempted to set forth the current state of the law in determining
when parents are legally responsible for the tortious acts of their children and other affiliated issues that arise with the prosecution of this
type of suit.
165. See TEX. R. Cv. P. 37.
166. See Valley Indus., Inc., 733 S.W.2d at 721; Threeway Constructors, Inc., 659
S.W.2d at 701-02.
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